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Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
as amended (ERISA), thirty years ago to protect private sector employee bene-
fit plans. ERISA, with certain exceptions, applies to any employee benefit plan
maintained by an employer engaged in commerce. Congress specifically
excluded certain executive (non-qualified deferred compensation) pension ben-
efit plans, so-called "top hat plans," from ERISA's substantive coverage, yet
required these plans to comply with ERISA's reporting and enforcement
requirements. In all of ERISA, top hat plans are unique: they are covered by
trust law, while possessing none of the attributes of a trust. Top hat plans sit
atop the proverbial fence: they are part-way in ERISA, and part-way out of
ERISA. Because of their "square peg in a round hole" fit, courts have strug-
gled with top hat plan benefits disputes.
A particular area of disagreement among the circuits regards the appropri-
ate standard of review of a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits when
that administrator operates under a conflict of interest. This is the case for
every top hat administrator because of the mandatory unfunded nature of top
hat plans and the administrator's lack of fiduciary responsibilities to the top hat
plan participant.
This note makes three alternative recommendations to enable ERISA to
meet its original objectives of protection and uniformity, which are presently
lacking for top hat plan participants. First, this note recommends that Congress
amend ERISA to exclude top hat plans from ERISA's reach altogether. Recog-
nizing that this change will be strongly opposed by plan administrators because
it will not allow them to continue the unintended protections they presently
enjoy under ERISA, an alternative to include top hat plans in ERISA so that
they benefit from protections afforded other ERISA pension benefit plans is
considered. Last, absent any statutory changes to ERISA, the courts should
review all top hat claim denials de novo given top hat plan administrators'
inherent conflict of interest in deciding claim denials.
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Part II of this note will review Congress's purpose in enacting ERISA and
describe the various types and requirements of, and provisions for, pension
plans covered by ERISA. Top hat plans and the similar, yet differently-situated
excess benefit plans will be described along with the rationale in excluding
their plan participants from some (or all) of ERISA's protections.
This section will also describe ERISA benefits denial standards of review,
starting with the Supreme Court's Firestone pronouncement that an administra-
tor's denial of benefits was to be reviewed de novo, unless the plan provided
discretionary authority to the administrator, in which case an abuse of discre-
tion standard would apply. A discussion of the type of language that consti-
tutes sufficient plan language conferring discretionary authority to a plan
administrator follows. This section concludes with a review of the inconsisten-
cies among the circuits in applying Firestone's holding, as well as a discussion
of the problem of top hat plan administrators' inherent conflict of interest in
administering these plans.
Part III will analyze top hat plans, their unlikely inclusion in ERISA based
on trust law, and the resulting consequences to plan participants, along with
suggestions to provide a better fit for top hat plans either under contract law, by
funding top hat plans, or by simply utilizing a uniform de novo standard of
judicial review of plan administrators' decisions.
Finally, Part IV will anticipate and discuss some of the consequences of
the recommendations and summarize the recommendations contained herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Congress's Purpose in Enacting ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a fed-
eral statute that regulates private sector employee benefit plans.' ERISA was
designed "to protect the integrity of those plans and the expectations of their
participants and beneficiaries." 2 Congress also intended to create uniformity
and minimum standards for administering ERISA plans.3 To accomplish these
comprehensive goals, ERISA prescribes a uniform set of requirements for
employers who voluntarily provide employee benefit plans. 4 These require-
ments cover both pension and welfare plans, funded and unfunded, (tax) quali-
fied and non-qualified plans in varying degrees.5
ERISA contains three subchapters. Subchapter I, entitled "Protection of
Employee Benefit Rights,"6 is divided into Subtitles A and B. Subtitle A con-
tains findings, definitions and the coverage provisions governing the entire
1 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000).
2 Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752F.2d 923, 929 (3d Cir. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 110 (3d Cir.
1993).
3 See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643, 4647, 4650.
4 Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REv. 1083, 1084 (2001).
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461.
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145.
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Act, 7 while Subtitle B contains substantive regulatory provisions as well as
specific limitations of coverage.8 Subtitle B is comprised of seven distinct
parts: Part 1, containing requirements on reporting and disclosure;9 Part 2, con-
taining participation, vesting and other substantive standards;'° Part 3, regard-
ing funding;" Part 4, regarding fiduciary responsibility; 12 Part 5, regarding
administration and enforcement; 13 Part 6, regarding continuation coverage
under group health plans;' 4 and Part 7, regarding portability, nondiscrimina-
tion, and other rules regarding group health plans. 5
Subchapter I of ERISA generally applies to any type of employee benefit
plan, whether welfare plans, pension plans, or both. 1 6 An employee welfare
benefit plan is a plan established or maintained by an employer to provide
participants or their beneficiaries certain benefits, such as benefits in the event
of death or disability.' 7 An employee pension benefit plan is a plan established
or maintained by an employer that either: (1) provides retirement income to
employees; or (2) results in the deferral of income until the employee's
employment is terminated or beyond.' 8
Some pension and welfare plans are partially or totally excluded from
ERISA's substantive and procedural protections. Top hat plans and excess
benefit plans, while similar, are treated differently from each other, and from
other fully-covered ERISA benefit plans. A key distinction between top hat
plans and other fully covered ERISA plans depends on whether the plan is
funded.
B. Funded and Unfunded Benefit Plans
ERISA does not define "funded" to assist in the determination of whether
a plan qualifies as a top hat plan. However, case law has established that to be
a funded plan under ERISA, the plan assets must be "segregated from the gen-
eral assets of the employer [such that the assets] are not available to general
creditors if the employer becomes insolvent."' 9
In a much-quoted ERISA funding case, Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., the Eighth Circuit stated: "[flunding implies the existence of a res sepa-
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003 (General Provisions).
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1145 (Regulatory Provisions).
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1147.
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169.
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183, 1185-1185b, 1191-1191c.
16 Susan G. Curtis & Richard G. Schwartz, ERISA Coverage, 574 PLI/TAx 577, 579 (2003).
17 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). See also Curtis & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 580 (listing benefits
as including: "medical, surgical, hospital care or benefits, benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, vacation benefits, apprenticeships and other
training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, prepaid legal services or any benefit
contained in § 302(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, except for pensions
on retirement or death and the insurance to provide for such pensions.").
18 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).




rate from the ordinary assets of the corporation."2 ° Since Dependahl, the exis-
tence of a separate res or corpus has been significant to courts' determination
of funding.2 Thus, participants of unfunded plans have no preferred claim or
ownership interest in plan assets, because there are no designated plan assets.
The rights of an unfunded plan participant are equivalent to those of an
unsecured creditor of the employer's general assets.22
Additionally, the Department of Labor (DOL) determines whether a plan
is funded based on the tax consequences of the employer's plan arrangement.
The DOL considers a plan to be unfunded when plan participants "do not incur
tax liability during the year that the contributions to the plan are made."23 The
tax treatment of pension plans is determined based on whether the plans meet
certain Internal Revenue Code (IRC) requirements, resulting in the distinction
between "qualified" and "non-qualified" plans.
C. Qualified and Non-Qualified Pension Plans
The fundamental goal of either qualified or non-qualified deferred com-
pensation plans is to defer tax liability. Each of these plans accomplishes this
goal in very different ways.
A qualified plan meets requirements imposed by the IRC, including mini-
mum coverage and nondiscrimination requirements, and limitations on the
amount of benefits that can be provided.24 When a plan complies with these
IRC requirements, it "qualifies" for favorable tax treatment, both to the
employer and to the employee. The employer is permitted to take a tax deduc-
tion for any amounts contributed to the qualified plan, while the employee is
not taxed on the benefits until he is actually paid from the plan, usually after
retirement when the individual's tax rate is lower.25
A non-qualified plan can provide benefits in excess of those permitted
under the qualified plan limitations.26 Additionally, a non-qualified plan is not
required to meet the same minimum coverage and nondiscrimination standards
of a qualified plan.27 However, the tax treatment of a non-qualified plan is not
as favorable as that of a qualified plan. The employer does not get an immedi-
ate tax deduction, but instead can take the deduction at the time the benefits are
actually paid to the employee. If the plan is unfunded and unsecured, the
employee is not taxed until the time he receives the benefits.28 Significantly,
however, the employee loses the security he would otherwise have under
ERISA if the plan was a qualified, funded plan.
20 Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1214 (8th Cir. 1981).
21 See Belsky v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 1987); Miller v.
Heller, 915 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 848 F.
Supp. at 1518.
22 Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 2000).
23 Miller, 915 F. Supp. at 659 (discussing DOL [Department of Labor] Opinion Letters and
the DOL's deference to the Internal Revenue Service in its funding determinations).
24 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2000).
25 I.R.C. §§ 404(a) (1974), 402(a) (2004).
26 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
27 Id.
28 I.R.C. § 83 (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-3(e) (2000) (excluding from the definition of prop-
erty "an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in the future").
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D. Fiduciary Responsibilities under ERISA
ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control in the management of a plan or exercises any
authority or control in the management or disposition of the plan's assets.2 9
The primary responsibility of a fiduciary is to administer the benefit plan
"solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits and paying plan expenses."3 ° Fiduciaries must
avoid conflicts of interest, meaning "they may not engage in transactions on
behalf of the plan that benefit parties related to the plan," including the plan
sponsor.3" Fiduciary duties apply to all ERISA covered benefit plans unless a
plan is specifically excluded from those duties within the statute. Top hat plan
administrators are exempted from any fiduciary duties.3"
E. ERISA's Enforcement Provision
ERISA's enforcement provision, § 502(a)(3), allows a benefit plan partici-
pant to obtain "appropriate equitable relief' only to redress violations of
ERISA or to enforce the terms of the plan.33 "ERISA's broad preemption pro-
vision makes it clear that Congress intended to establish employee benefit plan
regulation as an exclusive federal concern, with federal law to apply exclu-
sively, even where ERISA itself furnishes no answer.' 34
Thus, ERISA preempts state law causes of action for any benefit plan
covered by ERISA.3 5 Additionally, ERISA precludes any opportunity for a
jury trial, and requires a plaintiff to sue the plan itself.36
F. Excess Benefit Plans
An excess benefit plan, under ERISA, is defined as "a plan maintained by
an employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees
in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by section
415 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] . . . ."" To be an excess benefit
plan, the plan can be either funded or unfunded, but the plan itself must
expressly refer to IRC § 415 or to its substantive provisions.38
29 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
30 U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Fiduciary Responsibilities, at http:/lwww.dol.gov/doll topic/health-
plans/fiduciaryresp.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
31 id.
32 29 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(1).
33 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 935 (3d
Cir. 1985) (stating "[t]he plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) provides a cause of action
either to enforce the substantive provisions of the Act or to recover benefits due or otherwise
enforce the terms of a particular plan.").
" In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(citing 120 Cong. Rec. S15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
36 Pamela Baker, Top Hat Plans Issues and Developments, SH006 ALI-ABA 489, 538-39
(Oct. 2002).
37 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36).




If funded, an excess benefit plan is an ERISA-covered plan.39 However,
Congress excluded unfunded excess benefit plans from ERISA, in their
entirety.4° Because unfunded excess benefit plans are totally exempt from
ERISA, they are adjudicated according to contract principles.4"
G. Top Hat Plans
Top hat plans are pension benefit plans that are unfunded and "maintained
by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation
for a select group of management or highly compensated employees."42 Top
hat plans are implemented to defeat the contribution limits of qualified retire-
ment plans. For instance, while a non-executive employee can expect to
receive a retirement income of seventy to seventy-five percent of pre-retirement
income from a comlination of tax-qualified plans and Social Security, an exec-
utive will commonly receive only thirty to thirty-five percent of pre-retirement
income from these same benefits.4 3
Top hat plans are excluded from ERISA's vesting, 4 funding,4 5 and fiduci-
ary responsibility requirements;46 but they are subject to ERISA's reporting
and disclosure provisions,4 7 and its administration and enforcement require-
ments.48 Unlike excess benefit plans, top hat plans are limited in both the num-
ber and type of participants that can be included in the plan.49
In explaining why Congress deliberately chose to exclude executives and
highly compensated employees from the substantive protections of ERISA, the
Department of Labor stated:
[I]n providing relief for "top-hat" plans from the broad remedial provisions of
ERISA, Congress recognized that certain individuals, by virtue of their position or
compensation level, have the ability to affect or substantially influence, through
negotiation or otherwise, the design and operation of their deferred compensation
plan, taking into consideration any risks attendant thereto, and, therefore, would not
need the substantive rights and protections of Title 1.50
ERISA preempts state law causes of action regarding top hat plans. 51 This
means that even though a top hat plan is not subject to ERISA's fiduciary rules,
state law claims asserting negligence, misrepresentation, or fraud are pre-
39 Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 1981).
40 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5).
41 Baker, supra note 36, at 484.
42 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).
43 Lynn Siewert, Non Qualified Deferred Compensation, at http://401kpsp.com/nqdc.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (1979) (excepting top hat plans from ERISA's vesting
requirements).
45 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (1979) (excepting top hat plans from ERISA's funding
requirements).
46 29 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(1) (1999) (excepting top hat plans from ERISA's fiduciary responsi-
bility requirements).
47 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
48 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145.
49 Baker, supra note 36, at 494.
50 DOL Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 90-14 A, 1990 WL
123933, at *1 (May 8, 1990).
51 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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empted where the claim "relates to" an ERISA-covered plan.5 2 Additionally,
the plaintiff in an ERISA action has no opportunity for a jury trial and must sue
the plan itself.
53
Because of their unique part-way in, part-way out ERISA coverage, the
treatment of top hat plans has perplexed the courts. As will be discussed next,
ERISA is based on trust law, yet top hat plan participants benefit from none of
those trust-like provisions (i.e., funding, vesting, and the fiduciary responsibili-
ties of administrators) built into ERISA to protect most other plan participants.
H. The Supreme Court, Firestone, and the Standard of Review
In Bruch v. Firestone,54 six Firestone employees filed a class action law-
suit claiming they were due certain severance benefits under an employee wel-
fare benefit plan as a result of Firestone's sale of its Plastics division.5 5 The
district court granted Firestone's motion for summary judgment, holding that
Firestone's decision not to pay the severance benefits was not arbitrary or
capricious.
56
The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment, noting that, while most
federal courts reviewed benefit denials under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, this case involved a conflicted administrator.57 The court of appeals then
held that, in cases where fiduciaries and administrators had some bias or
adverse interest, as when an employer is both the fiduciary and administrator of
an unfunded benefit plan, a review of its decision should be made under de
novo judicial review.58
On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts
among the courts of appeals regarding the appropriate standard of review in
ERISA benefits denials challenges.59 Although ERISA is a comprehensive
piece of legislation, the Court observed that the statute does not provide the
appropriate standard of review for challenges to benefit eligibility
determinations.6 °
As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Firestone decision, "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law."'" ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility requirements "codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to fiduciaries cer-
tain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."' 62 Nodding to
52 Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 505, 515 (5th Cir.
2002).
" Baker, supra note 36, at 538-39.
51 Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F.Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
55 Id. at 522.
56 Id. at 524.
57 Firestone, 828 F.2d at 138-40.
58 Id. at 149.
59 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108. In her opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor
explained that ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) provides for suits "to recover benefits due under the
plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, and to obtain a declaratory judgment of
future entitlement to benefits under the provisions of the plan contract." Id.
60 Id. at 109.
61 Id. at 110.
62 H.R.REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973).
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trust law, the Court stated, "[t]rust principles make a deferential standard of
review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. '"63
The Court then clarified that an administrator's "discretionary powers"
must come from the trust instrument itself.64 Based on that reasoning, and the
fact that Firestone's benefit plans did not provide any discretion to the adminis-
trator, the Court rejected Firestone's argument that its benefits denial decision
should be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard.65 Instead, the
Court held that "a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be
reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administra-
tor or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan."6 6
The Firestone Court stated:
[F]or purposes of actions under § 1132(a)(l)(B), the de novo standard of review
applies regardless of whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless
of whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual con-
flict of interest. Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed
as a "facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. 67
Sadly, this language has resulted in inconsistencies among the courts of
appeals regarding the application of appropriate standards of review, particu-
larly in unfunded top hat plans.6 8 In spite of the fact that the Court intended the
de novo standard be applied to any ERISA plan (unless the administrator was
given discretion in the plan document for its decisions) whether the plan was
funded or not, the circuit courts have not applied this mandate uniformly.
L Discretionary Authority
In Firestone, the Supreme Court held that a plan administrator's denial of
benefits was to be reviewed de novo, unless the benefit plan gives the adminis-
trator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan, in which case it would then be reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard. 69 Thus, "the default is that the administrator has no
discretion, and the administrator has to show that the plan gives it discretionary
authority in order to get any judicial deference to its decision.' '7O
The circuit courts appear to agree that there are no "magic words" required
to determine the scope of judicial review of benefit denial decisions.7" How-
63 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 112-115.
66 Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
67 Id.
68 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1119-30.
69 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
70 Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
71 Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that Firestone
did not suggest that "discretionary authority hinges on incantation of the word 'discretion' or
any other 'magic word."'); Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243,
251-52 (2d Cir. 1999); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union 4-
447, 47 F.3d 139, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1995); Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327,
331 (7th Cir. 2000); Sandy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir.
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ever, the courts interpret what constitutes sufficient plan language conferring
discretion somewhat differently. Some courts require that the grant of discre-
tion be "clear and unequivocal, ' 72 while others require that the language
"expressly confers such authority,"7 3 and others require the grant of discretion-
ary authority to the administrator to be "clear."74 At least one circuit actually
has drafted language for employers to include in their ERISA plans to ensure
discretionary review.7 5
In spite of this seeming agreement, a plan's language in one circuit could
confer discretionary authority while the same or similar language in another
circuit might not. In fact, the Ninth Circuit admitted this was the case in Sandy
v. Reliance Standard, 7 6 where the court held that requiring a claimant "to sub-
mit 'satisfactory proof does not unambiguously confer discretion under Kear-
ney." '77 The court acknowledged:
[T]his puts us in the awkward position of construing the effect of identical language
in plan documents of the same insurer differently from the Sixth Circuit, which held
that the requirement that a claimant submit 'satisfactory proof of Total Disability to
us' sufficiently granted discretion to Reliance in Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life
Ins. Co .... However, we are bound by Kearney.
7 8
There is no doubt many plan administrators amended their plans following
the Firestone holding to clearly "grant the plan administrator the authority to
determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of the plan.
' 79
Amending a plan to confer discretionary authority on the plan administrator is
an easy way for administrators to evade ERISA's intent of protecting the inter-
ests of plan participants in employee benefit plans.80
J. Disagreement Among the Courts of Appeals: Conflicted Administrators
and Top Hat Plans
In Firestone, Justice O'Connor stated that a fiduciary granted discretion-
ary authority operating under a conflict of interest is still entitled to the abuse of
discretion standard of review, although the conflict of interest must be consid-
ered as one factor in a court's determination of whether the fiduciary abused its
2000) ("For sure, there is no magic to the words 'discretion' or 'authority' - but we're not at
Hogwarts.").
72 Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254-58 (3d Cir. 1993); Sandy, 222 F.3d
at 1207.
71 Chevron Chem. Co., 47 F.3d at 142-43.
74 Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1998).
75 Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 331 (where Chief Judge Posner proposed the language:
"[b]enefits under this plan will be paid only if the plan administrator decides in his discretion
that the applicant is entitled to them").
76 Sandy, 222 F.3d. at 1205 n.2.
77 Id. at 1204 (citing Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999)).
78 Id. at 1205 n.2 (citing Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376 (6th Cir.
1996)).
79 Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Cases
and Other Developments, SC62 ALI-ABA 1, 105 (1998). See also Kinstler v. First Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing "the relative ease with
which ERISA plans may be worded explicitly to reserve to plan administrators the discre-
tionary authority that will insulate all aspects of their decisions from de novo review.").
80 29 U.S.C. §1001(a) (2000).
Winter 2004/05]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
discretion. 81 As noted above, the courts of appeals have implemented the Fire-
stone standard of review mandate in many different forms.82 A significant area
of disagreement among the circuits relates to the standard of review when the
administrator or fiduciary has a conflict of interest. "A conflict of interest
occurs when the denial [of a benefit claim] has the potential to benefit the one
making the decision., 83 This conflict is inherent when a plan administrator
makes claims determinations that could affect the company's financial interests
or profits. 84
Under trust law, a fiduciary is required to make all decisions in the benefi-
ciary's best interest;85 but, with no funding or fiduciary responsibilities
required by ERISA, top hat plan administrators are not "fiduciaries" and are not
required to make any decisions in the participant's best interest. The difficulty
facing the circuits today is the application of Firestone's trust-based standard
of review to contract-based top hat plans, because Firestone was intended to
address all benefit plans, funded and unfunded.86
Funded benefit plans under ERISA impose fiduciary responsibilities on
the administrator. So, even when the employer is both the settlor of the benefit
plan and the trustee of the plan assets, fiduciary duties require that he make
decisions in the best interest of the plan participants.87 Conversely, unfunded
pension benefit plans under ERISA are unsecured promises to pay benefits at
termination or later.88 Essentially, then, unfunded pension plans are paid on an
as-needed basis, which results in an inherent conflict between the promissor's
role as employer and its role as plan administrator: the decision to pay benefits
- or not - will "always directly impact the cost to the employer. 89
The Ninth Circuit analogizes the inherent conflict of unfunded top hat plan
administrators to that of insurance companies acting as plan administrators of
unfunded employee welfare benefit plans. 90 In the welfare benefit situation,
other circuits conclude that an insurance company that also acts as the plan
administrator making the decision whether to pay a claim from its own assets
puts the insurer in a "perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a busi-
ness." 9' Still other circuits require that a claimant prove an actual conflict of
interest beyond the inherent conflict in order to use a less deferential standard
81 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
82 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
83 David Trueman, Strategies for Challenging Benefit Denials Under ERISA, http://
truemanlaw.com/newpage33.htm (Feb. 1999) (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
84 Id.
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 2, cmt b. (2003).
86 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
87 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1147.
88 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000). The unfunded nature of top hat plans requires that pay-
ment be made at the employee's termination or later, and that the assets available to the
employee under the top hat plan also be available to any creditor of the company - thus the
employee is in the same position as any other unsecured creditor to obtain his benefit. Dem-
ery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 2000).
89 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1147-48.
90 Friedrich v. Intel, 181 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding an employer acting as
the administrator of a self-funded plan is inherently self-interested).
91 Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 384 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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of review than the arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard given
to fiduciaries with discretionary authority in Firestone.92
There is no current body of law that specifically regards conflict of interest
situations involving top hat plans, which are by definition unfunded pension
benefit plans. However, in conflict of interest situations involving funded pen-
sion benefits plans, or unfunded welfare benefits plans, the courts of appeals
have developed three different methodologies for determining the appropriate
standard for reviewing the plan administrator's decisionmaking.93 The main
difference among these three methodologies hinges on how much discretion a
court determines a conflicted fiduciary should receive when the decisions it
made could be construed to be in the fiduciary's best interest, rather than in the
beneficiary's best interest.
94
1. De Novo Standard: Second Circuit
The Second Circuit uses a two-part test to determine the standard of
review once a claimant alleges a conflict of interest in the plan administrator's
decision.95 First, the court determines whether the administrator's decision was
reasonable. 96 Second, the court determines whether a conflict of interest influ-
enced the administrator.9 7 If a conflict of interest is found, then the court
applies the de novo standard of review, in place of the abuse of discretion
standard normally applicable when a plan' administrator reserves for itself dis-
cretionary authority to interpret the terms of the plan document.9 8
2. Sliding Scale or Heightened Arbitrary and Capricious Standard:
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits
The majority of circuits adjust the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review afforded a plan administrator once a conflict of interest is inferred.99
92 See Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 415, 419 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citing Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998), where the court
stated it would use the arbitrary and capricious standard "with the burden on the claimant to
show that the [insurer's] decision was improperly motivated"); Kirk v. Readers Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 57 Fed. Appx. 20, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that in cases of conflicted
administrators, "that conflict becomes a factor in our application of arbitrary and capricious
review" when plaintiff failed to produce evidence proving administrator was influenced by
the alleged conflict).
9' Nola A. Kohler, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits Concerning the
Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth
Circuit's Adoption of the Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L.
REV. 815, 827 (1999) [hereinafter "Conflict of Interest Analysis"].
94 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1150-62.
95 Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1996).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1256.
99 See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998); Pinto v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 391 (3d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Group Hospitali-
zation & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., 188 F.3d
287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984-85 (6th Cit.
1991); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th
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Essentially, the courts in these circuits adjust the level of deference given a plan
administrator depending on the degree of the conflict in a given situation,
apparently in an attempt to neutralize the conflicted decision. This approach
appears to be favored by the majority of circuits because it allows the courts to
comply with the Supreme Court's Firestone mandate to use an abuse of discre-
tion standard while weighing the conflict as a "factor in determining whether
there is an abuse of discretion.""
3. Presumptively Void Standard: Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
In the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, if the court finds that a plan adminis-
trator's conflict of interest influenced his decision, there is a presumption that
the decision is void.1"' The burden then shifts to the administrator to prove the
conflict of interest did not affect its decision."' 2 If the plan administrator can-
not rebut the presumption, the court reviews the plan administrator's decision
under a more searching standard of review.'13
The difference in application of the standard of review by the various cir-
cuits in conflicted administrator situations is exacerbated when the plan is a top
hat plan. This is so because top hat plans are not administered by a fiduciary
with an obligation to make plan decisions in the best interest of the plan partici-
pant. Thus, with the circuit courts in disagreement as to the standard of review
for plans administered by fiduciaries, there is little likelihood that consistency
among the circuit courts will result when the standard of review is applied to
top hat plans, without either legislative changes to ERISA or further interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court itself.1"
III. ANALYSIS
A. Top Hat Plans Should be Removed from ERISA's Purview
Top hat plans are unique among ERISA benefit plans.1"5 While partici-
pants must utilize ERISA's enforcement provisions to challenge benefit deni-
Cir. 1988); Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2000); Pitman v.
Blue Cross, 217 F.3d 1291, 1297 (10th Cir. 2000).
10o Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), affig in part, rev'g in
part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa.
1986). (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)).
101 Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d
794, 797 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556,
1564 (11 th Cir. 1990).
102 Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995); Brown, 898 F.2d
at 1564.
103 Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323 (if the conflicted plan administrator cannot carry the burden of
showing the conflict did not influence its decision to deny the benefit, the review will be de
novo); Brown, 898 F.2d at 1568 (a fiduciary operating under a conflict of interest is entitled
to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review but "the degree of deference actually exer-
cised in application of the standard will be significantly diminished").
1o4 Indeed, some courts do not even recognize the distinction between the fiduciary duties of
administrators of funded plans and the non-fiduciary interests of top hat plan administrators.
See Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1999).
105 Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating "a top hat
plan is a unique animal under ERISA's provisions. These plans are intended to compensate
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als, none of the substantive provisions of ERISA apply to top hat plans. 10 6 It is
just this position - being "not all the way in" ERISA, yet still bound by ERISA
- that imposes hardships on top hat participants by preempting state law causes
of action, while simultaneously benefiting employers in the denial of top hat
benefit claims.'0 7 ERISA's preemption clause was intended to provide uni-
formity in the administration of pension plan benefits, but the result is that the
preemption clause is now being used as a shield for plan administrators and
insurers to limit their liability by invoking ERISA's preemption of state law
causes of action even when ERISA provides no remedy. °8 This result is
incompatible with ERISA's objective of protecting participants' rights.10 9
Congress should amend ERISA to exempt top hat plans from ERISA's
coverage, much as it presently does with unfunded excess benefit plans." 0
There are two primary reasons for this proposal: first, top hat plans do not fit
within the trust-like environment of ERISA and more closely resemble unilat-
eral contracts; and second, the rationale Congress used to exempt top hat par-
ticipants from ERISA's substantive provisions is not sound and works against
such participants, binding them to ERISA's enforcement provisions while pre-
cluding breach of contract actions.
1. Top Hat Plans are Unilateral Contracts, Not Trusts
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising from a manifesta-
tion of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title
to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of... one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee. 
111
Top hat plans possess none of the elements of a trust. There is no trust
property because, by definition, top hat plans must be unfunded." 2 Because a
top hat plan is unfunded, there is no property transfer from a settlor to a trustee;
similarly, there is no legal title held for the benefit of a beneficiary holding
equitable title. Top hat plan administrators are exempted from ERISA's fiduci-
ary responsibilities and, as such, have no duty to act in the plan participant's
only highly-paid executives, and the Department of Labor has expressed the view that such
employees are in a strong bargaining position relative to their employers and thus do not
require the same substantive protections that are necessary for other employees.").
106 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(l) (2000).
107 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1091 (summarizing ERISA's preemption clause as broadly
construed to restrict and preempt state contract and tort causes of action, leaving only
ERISA's federal causes of action as a participant's only form of remedy).
108 See e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing 120 CONG.
REc. S15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)); Cannon v. Group Health
Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1996).
109 Kennedy, supra note 4.
110 The unfunded excess benefit plan differs from the top hat plan, because the unfunded
excess benefit plan is not subject to either the enforcement or substantive provisions of
ERISA. "In terms of design, the difference between a top hat plan and an excess benefit
plan is, in most circumstances, that the top hat plan can have multiple broad purposes, while
an excess benefit plan has the sole purpose of avoiding the limitations imposed by § 415 of
the Internal Revenue Code." Garratt v. Knowles, 245 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2001).
11" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
112 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (2000).
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best interest." 3  In spite of these facts, top hat participants are limited to
ERISA's federal causes of action as their only remedies.1 14
In Firestone, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]rust principles make a def-
erential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary
powers," 1 5 regardless of whether the plan is funded or unfunded and without
regard to whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a conflict of
interest.1 6 But when applied to the unilateral contract-like top hat plan, the
awarding of discretionary authority is lethal to a claimant's cause of action.
In a top hat plan, the plan administrator is not a fiduciary within trust law
terms - the administrator has no obligation to act in the participant's interest at
all. Then to allow the addition of simple discretionary authority language to
cloak the administrator with an abuse of discretion review leaves the claimant
with no ability to pursue an action unless he can prove the administrator acted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Additionally, the claimant is foreclosed
from pursuing statei law causes of actions because of ERISA's preemption
clause.117
Some courts of appeal have rejected applying the Supreme Court's Fire-
stone standard of review mandate to top hat plans reasoning that, because top
hat plans are not trusts, the Firestone decision does not apply to top hat
plans.' 18 These courts characterize top hat plans as being akin to unilateral
contracts rather than fitting within ERISA's trust premise.11 9
The Third Circuit has "routinely" treated top hat plans differently from
other ERISA plans.120 In Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit
applied contract law principles to resolve an ERISA top hat claim, and con-
cluded that the top hat plan should be treated as a unilateral contract. 2 In
Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., the Third Circuit concluded that the exemption
from ERISA's fiduciary provisions differentiates top hat plans from funded
13 Id. § I101(a)(1).
114 Id. § 1144(a).
15 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989), affg in part, rev'g in
part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
116 Id. at 115.
117 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
118 Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We have held that
[top hat] plans are more akin to unilateral contracts than to the trust-like structure normally
found in ERISA plans. Accordingly, top hat plans are not subject to any of ERISA's substan-
tive provisions, including its requirements for vesting and funding ... the administrators of
these plans [are] not subject to ERISA's fiduciary requirements .... ); see also In re New
Valley Corp, 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996); Carr v. First Nationwide Bank, 816 F.Supp.
1476, 1492 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (holding that top hat plans should be interpreted in keeping with
the principles that govern unilateral contracts).
119 Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt. Employee Sav. Plan, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 352 U.S.
918 (1956) ("A pension plan is a unilateral contract which creates a vested right in those
employees who accept the offer it contains by continuing in employment for the requisite
number of years.")); Carr, 816 F.Supp. at 1488 ("Pension benefit plans are unilateral con-
tracts which employees accept by appropriate performance.").
120 Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 436 (referencing In re New Valley, 89 F.3d at 143 and Kemmerer
v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 1995)).
121 Id. at 443.
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benefit plans in the remedy available.1 22 In In re New Valley Corp., the court
reasoned "[top hat employees have rights only under the contract. Where a
contract action fails, they have no recourse. Welfare benefit plan participants,
by contrast, enjoy an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Top hat participants
have no such alternative remedy. They must seek their remedy in contract
law."
' 123
In Kemmerer, the Third Circuit applied unilateral contract principles to an
ERISA claim brought by participants against their employer for terminating a
top hat plan. 124 The court stated, "once the employee performs, the offer
becomes irrevocable, the contract is completed, and the employer is required to
comply with its side of the bargain.' 1 25 Agreeing with Carr v. First Nation-
wide Bank,12 6 the Third Circuit said that, even when a plan reserves the ability
for the plan sponsor to terminate the plan, a participant's acceptance by per-
formance "closes that door under unilateral contract principles."'127 To inter-
pret a top hat plan in any other way "would make the plan's several specific
and mandatory provisions ineffective, rendering the promises embodied therein
completely illusory."
' 128
In Spacek v. Maritime Association 129 the Fifth Circuit considered a case
where the employer amended a pension plan after an employee's retirement,
and the employee sued under ERISA claiming a reduction in benefits.' 3 ° In
distinguishing the "ordinary pension plan before it" from top hat plans, the
court recognized that, because top hat plans are not subject to ERISA's "full
panoply of regulations," top hat plans are similar to pre-ERISA pension plans
in that "no statutory mechanism exists to safeguard the expectations of top hat
plan participants in obtaining their deferred compensation."1'' The Spacek
court explained that, absent such a safeguard, an equity argument exists for
applying contract law to top hat cases, similar to contract analysis favoring the
pensioner in pre-ERISA pension plan cases. 13
2
The Spacek court further expanded on the problems of including top hat
plans in ERISA without providing the same protections to top hat participants
122 Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 286-87.
123 In re New Valley, 89 F.3d at 153-54.
124 Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 285.
125 Id. at 287.
126 Carr v. First Nationwide Bank, 816 F.Supp. 1476, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
127 Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 288 (quoting Carr, 816 F.Supp. at 1494).
128 Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 288. The Third Circuit stated:
Congress exempted top hat plans from ERISA's vesting requirements in large part because it
recognized that high level executives retain sufficient bargaining power to negotiate particular
terms and rights under the plan and therefore do not need ERISA's substantive rights and protec-
tions. This being so, "it would be absurd to deny such individuals the ability to enforce the terms
of their plans in contract... it would be difficult to imagine what top hat participants would have
the power to obtain through negotiation or otherwise - apparently not much more than illusory
promises."
Id. (citing Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 138, 144 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (quoting
Carr, 816 F.Supp. at 1492)).
129 Spacek v. Maritime Assoc., I L A Pension Plan, 134 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1998).
130 Id.




as to any other pension participant. Specifically, the court said that a promise is
illusory if it creates no obligation on the part of the purported promisor. 133 The
court said:
Interpreting a broad amendment provision in a top hat plan to allow an employer to
... sharply diminish the benefits that it provides renders the employer's obligations
under the plan illusory because . . . the employer has no duty of performance under
the plan. This is not the case with an ordinary pension plan subject to all of ERISA's
statutory safeguards because the backdrop of ERISA guarantees that the employer
will have some obligation of performance under the pension plan.
134
If top hat plans were removed entirely from ERISA, a claimant would be
able to file state contract or tort causes of action and would have the opportu-
nity for a jury trial - alternatives foreclosed to claimants today under ERISA's
enforcement provisions.1 35 Participants would not be misled into believing
their pension benefits were protected because they were "ERISA-covered
plans." Plan administrators would not be able to automatically invoke the Fire-
stone protection of writing discretionary authority into their plans, and instead
would be uniformly subjected to a de novo standard of review.
1. DOL's Explanation of Executives' Bargaining Power May Have
Been Overstated
Congress excluded executives and highly compensated individuals from
ERISA's substantive protections because it decided these individuals "have the
ability to affect or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the
design and operation of their deferred compensation plan, taking into consider-
ation any risks attendant thereto .... 136 However, the presumption that top
hat participants have the ability to negotiate their pension plans is not entirely
realistic. Certainly some top hat participants have this ability, but to apply a
blanket assertion to the entire class of top hat participants seems overly
broad. 1
37
One court noted that the justification for excluding top hat participants
from ERISA's substantive provisions recognizes that "the persons to be aided
by the statute lacked sufficient economic bargaining power to obtain contrac-
tual rights to nonforfeitable benefits." '3 8 But simply because funded pension
plan participants were deemed to be more in need of contractual rights to non-
forfeitable benefits does not imply that all top hat participants have no need for
those same contractual rights. The exclusion of top hat participants from
133 Id. at 297.
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 Baker, supra note 36, at 538-39.
136 DOL Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 90-14 A, 1990 WL
123933, at *1 (May 8, 1990).
137 See Matthews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that
pension plans are usually not negotiated).
138 Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706-07 (4th Cir. 1986), on remand,
717 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
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ERISA's substantive provisions is contrary to the policy interest in protecting
pension benefit rights as a whole. 13
9
Further, because ERISA derived in part from the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA),' 4 ° Congress must have realized that collectively-bar-
gained benefit plans comprise a significant percentage of all benefit plans. In
fact, thirty-one percent of those participants covered by pension plans in 1995
were participants in collectively-bargained plans.14 1 By the very nature of col-
lective bargaining, the terms, design, and operation of those pension plans were
affected or influenced by the plan participant, through his elected labor union
representative's negotiations and the participant's personal vote to accept the
collectively-bargained agreement.
So, while it is absolutely certain that those participants represented by
labor unions have negotiated the terms and design of their pension plans, every
one of those participants enjoys the funding, vesting, and fiduciary protections
inherent in ERISA. Conversely, top hat plan participants, limited to "a select
group of management or highly compensated employees," 14 2 are entirely
excluded from the same protections given other participants who "have the
ability to affect or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise"
their benefit plans.
143
Although the meaning of the term "highly compensated" is not defined
within ERISA, it was found to apply in one recent case where the average
salary of plan participants was "around $30,000 a year."' 44 It is hard to imag-
ine that, when Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it intended to exclude
employees earning "around $30,000" in 1997 from the substantive protections
ERISA provides other benefit plan participants, simply because others within
that organization earned even less.
Finally, there is no requirement in ERISA that top hat participants have
the ability to negotiate the terms and conditions of top hat plans, even though
courts have accepted the DOL's explanation regarding Congress's exclusion of
top hat participants from ERISA's substantive provisions. 145 And, in the con-
text of ERISA's intended protective functions, the exclusion of all top hat par-
139 Spacek v. Maritime Assoc., I L A Pension Plan, 134 F.3d 283, 295 (5th Cir. 1998).
(stating courts have traditionally protected the rights of pensioners "who have labored the
greater portion of their lives under an expectation that their hard work would bring them
security in retirement.").
14o Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989), affg in part, rev'g in
part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa.
1986). (noting Congress's intent to incorporate LMRA fiduciary law into ERISA).
"I' United States DOL, Pension & Welfare Benefits Administration, Abstract of 1995 Form
5500 Annual Reports, Private Pension Plan Bulletin No. 8, (Spring 1999) at http://
www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/opr/bulletl995/a_6.htm (indicating that, of a total of
87,452,000 participants in pension plans in 1995, 27,098,000 were participants in collec-
tively-bargained plans) (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
142 29 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(1).
143 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), I l01(a)(1).
14 Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 289 (2d Cir. 2000) (con-
cluding that because the average salary of plan participants was more than double that of the
average salary of all other bank employees, the plan participants were highly compensated
within the meaning of ERISA).
145 Baker, supra note 36, at 507.
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ticipants on the basis that some of them may have the ability to negotiate their
plans seems contrary to ERISA's goal of "interject[ing] elements of fairness,
disclosure, and due process to participants/beneficiaries under [benefit]
plans."
' 146
B. Top Hat Plans Should Be Included in ERISA
Instead of removing top hat plans from ERISA's coverage, Congress
could alternatively amend ERISA to apply most of its substantive provisions to
these plans, just like other pension benefit plans. While the rationale for apply-
ing ERISA's protections to top hat plans is sound, the consequences of top hat
plans effectively becoming "qualified" plans are more complex and
controversial.
1. Rationale for Applying ERISA's Substantive Provisions to Top Hat
Plans
ERISA's purpose is to provide comprehensive protection for private-sec-
tor employee benefit plan participants.14 7 One of Congress's primary reasons
for passing ERISA was to protect plan participants' expectations for benefits
promised by employers.' 48 But, because of ERISA's regulatory structure, top
hat plan participants' expectations are not protected by ERISA's substantive
provisions. 4 9
Congress exempted top hat plans on the basis that participants were
sophisticated enough to negotiate or influence their own deferred compensation
plans, "taking into consideration any risks attendant thereto, and, therefore,
would not need the substantive rights and protections of Title I.''150 However,
the risks attendant to top hat plans have very little to do with the ability of
executives to influence their benefit plans or the executives' performance and
more to do with the financial health of the employer. Given the increasing
numbers of corporate mergers and acquisitions ("change of control" events),
during which executives are particularly vulnerable, top hat benefits may be
lost entirely because of events over which the executive has no control, or had
no knowledge of at the time the executive became eligible in the top hat
plan.15 1
In most cases, losses under [a top hat plan] will occur because of changes
in the financial condition of the employer. It is impossible to anticipate such
146 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1175.
147 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(b), (c) (2000).
148 Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 929 (3d Cir. 1985).
149 Top hat plans are exempt from the participation and vesting rules of Part 2, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1051(2); the funding rules of Part 3, 29 U.S.C. § 108 l(a)(3); and the fiduciary responsibility
rules of Part 4, 29 U.S.C. §ll01(a)(1).
0 DOL Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Opinion 90-14 A, 1990 WL
123933, at *1 (May 8, 1990).
1'5 Carter G. Bishop & Marian McMahon Durkin, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Plans: A Review and Critique, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 43, 85 (1991). The authors con-
tinue, "[i]f one accepts the premise that retirement benefits should not be gambled on the
financial security of the employer, it is unacceptable that [top hat plans] should continue to
fall outside of ERISA's regulatory protection." Id.
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events as unknown future competition, technology changes, or litigation. Posi-
tion and power have little to do with forecasting unknown events. 152
At the time of ERISA's enactment, when Congress decided to exempt top
hat plans from ERISA's substantive protections, change of control events were
not as commonplace as they have since become. 153 Top hat participants are no
less deserving of having their retirement benefits protected than other plan par-
ticipants, and should be provided the same level of protection for their benefit
plans.
2. Effect of Qualified Status on Top Hat Plans
The tax treatment of qualified and nonqualified ERISA plans is complex
and governed by two enormous statutes: ERISA and IRC. Even those well
versed in the area of nonqualified deferred compensation plans caution that the
complexity is beyond all but tax experts.1 5"
Generally, there are income tax benefits to participants in top hat plans
that are unavailable in other plans. A top hat plan is an unfunded, non-qualified
deferred compensation plan. The participant is taxed at the time he receives the
deferred compensation, not at the time it is earned. The employer is able to
take a tax deduction at the time it pays the benefit. Likewise, a participant in a
qualified (funded) plan is not taxed until he receives a distribution from the
funded plan, which is usually at retirement, while the employer is able to take a
tax deduction at the time it makes the contribution to the plan.
However, the amount that can be contributed to a qualified plan is limited
by the IRC. 155 These restrictions limit the amount of benefits available to
highly compensated or executive management personnel, who then turn to non-
qualified benefit plans to supplement the restricted qualified benefit amount.
Employers have sound business reasons for preferring the payment of
deferred compensation to executives, instead of paying all compensation as
current cash compensation. These reasons often include tying executive com-
pensation to performance, or subjecting compensation to forfeiture on subse-
quent employment with a competitor. At the same time, the incentives for
avoiding ERISA funding are based on avoiding immediate taxation of the
employee when the compensation is deferred, and avoiding ERISA's minimum
coverage and participation rules (the "anti-discrimination" rules). 156
152 Id. (emphasis added). The authors additionally posit "[t]he loss of retirement security
cannot be justified on any grounds: the loss cannot be remedied. Justifying the lack of DOL
and ERISA intervention on the grounds that executives can take care of themselves simply
misses the point." Id.
153 In fact, change of control events that can affect top hat plan participants increased by
458% between 1985 and 1999. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 2001, Table No. 742 Mergers and Acquisitions - Summary: 1985 to 1999, at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/business.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
154 Bishop & Durkin, supra note 151, at 43. "The breadth, complexity and interrelationship
of the labor and tax regulatory regimes confine the understanding of the conditions of the
deferral to sophisticated tax planners." Id.
155 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2002).
156 Bishop & Durkin, supra note 151 (noting, however, that to receive the deferred tax
benefit "[t]he employee must accept full economic risk of the employer not being able to pay
the deferred compensation when due because of financial failure.").
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The inclusion of top hat plans in ERISA's substantive protections would
require that top hat plans become funded plans. Once a plan is funded, it
becomes subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties, thus affording immediate protec-
tion to the plan participant. Top hat plans would remain non-qualified plans,
however, because they provide benefits in excess of those permitted under the
qualified plan limitations. The compensation would be taxed to the employee
at the time of funding, usually when the compensation was actually earned,
which would eliminate the employee's benefit of tax deferral. Even without a
tax advantage to the plan participant, however, some commentators argue that
top hat plans would remain viable because they would continue to be used as a
method for executives to increase their retirement benefits.1 57 Most impor-
tantly, the plan participant could rely upon the security of the top hat plan
benefit, as does every other ERISA-covered plan participant.
To include top hat plans in ERISA's substantive protections, however, one
exception must still be made: top hat plans must remain exempt from ERISA's
anti-discrimination clause to allow these plans to remain limited to highly com-
pensated or management employees.1 58
Thus, for top hat plans to be covered by ERISA's substantive protections,
many factors would have to change: the employer would have to fund the plan
as the benefit accrued; the plan administrator would assume fiduciary responsi-
bilities to the plan participants; and the employee would be taxed at the time the
compensation was deferred, all while keeping top hat plans exempt from
ERISA's anti-discrimination clause. It seems unlikely these changes could eas-
ily be made in order to afford top hat plan participants a greater amount of
retirement security. To do so would result in potential hardship for the
employer (funding the plan earlier rather than later) and for the employee (pay-
ing taxes on deferred compensation earlier rather than later), in addition to
requiring congressional action altering the structure of ERISA.
C. Courts Should Apply a De Novo Standard of Review in Top Hat
Benefits Denial Cases
It is unlikely that Congress will amend ERISA to protect top hat partici-
pants. Those individuals deemed "highly compensated" or "management
employees" are not generally as sympathetic as average working-class employ-
ees. Because top hat participants are limited in number, there is not much visi-
bility when plan administration injustices occur, or when these few individuals
find themselves without their anticipated retirement security later in life.
But the fact that top hat participants are few in number, not as sympa-
thetic, and not as visible does not justify inequitable administration of retire-
ment benefits. In the absence of congressional action to amend ERISA to
remedy the unfairness inherent in the administration of top hat plans, the courts
should uniformly apply a de novo standard of review to plan administrator
decisions in top hat benefits denial cases. In other words, a top hat plan admin-
istrator should not be able to establish a deferential judicial standard of review
'51 Id. at 48.
158 Id. at 54.
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by writing language that gives itself discretionary authority in a plan in which it
owes no loyalty or fiduciary responsibilities to the plan participants.
1. Inherent Conflict of Administrator
Top hat plans are exempt from ERISA's funding provisions.15 9 Because
these plans are unfunded, the employer pays the benefits from its general assets
at the time the payments are due to the plan participant. An inherent conflict of
interest arises in top hat plan benefits denials because, in deciding eligibility
and interpreting the provisions of the plan, the plan administrator's decision
will always directly and immediately impact the cost to the employer.16 0 If the
plan administrator approves the benefit payment, the employer must pay these
unfunded benefits from its general assets.1 61 Conversely, if the plan adminis-
trator denies payment of the unfunded benefit, there is no cost to the employer
under the plan.'
62
The Eleventh Circuit's seminal case for standard of review of a conflicted
fiduciary, while not directly on point for non-fiduciary administrators in top hat
plans, is nonetheless instructive on the level of deference to be accorded admin-
istrators operating under a conflict of interest. In Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama, 163 the court declined to apply the highly deferential arbi-
trary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard of review because of an
insurance company's conflict of interest in administering an ERISA benefits
plan. 164
In Brown, the insurance company denied coverage that, had it been
approved, would have been paid out of its general funds. 165 Absent this con-
flict, the insurance company would have received Firestone's deferential abuse
of discretion standard of review. 166 However, the Brown court implemented
what it called a "heightened arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, not-
ing the "inherent conflict between the fiduciary role and the profit-making
objective of an insurance company makes a highly deferential standard of
review inappropriate. "167 The court reasoned that as a fiduciary, the principles
of trusts entitled the plan administrator's decision to a review by the arbitrary
and capricious standard, but that "the degree of deference actually exercised in
application of the standard will be significantly diminished" when a conflict of
interest exists.168 The court considered and dismissed reviewing the adminis-
trator's decision de novo on the grounds that, as a fiduciary, the insurance com-
pany had a duty of loyalty to the plan participants and was thus to be accorded
some level of deference.' 69
159 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (1999).
160 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1147-48.
161 Id. at 1147.
162 Id. at 1148.
163 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
164 Id. at 1558.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1562.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1568.
169 Id. at 1563.
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A top hat administrator lacks any such duty of loyalty or other fiduciary
duty. 17 0 Where insurance companies have been exempted from the ERISA
provisions that require that "all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held
in trust by one or more trustees," 17 1 insurance claims remain subject to state
laws that regulate insurance. 172 Conversely, a top hat plan participant is pre-
cluded from any state law actions to enforce a top hat plan.
173
The underlying rationale of Brown is that a fiduciary's self-interest may
compromise the fiduciary's duty of loyalty to plan participants. 74 In top hat
plans, however, the plan administrator's conflict is always inherent: with abso-
lutely no fiduciary responsibilities, the administrator determines whether to pay
a benefit, not from any designated fund, but from the administrator's current
assets.
175
2. The Trust-Law Based Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review is
Not Appropriate for Contract-Based Top Hat Plans
In its Firestone decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the trust law
de novo standard of review was in accordance with courts' interpretation of
benefit plans before Congress enacted ERISA. 176 Prior to ERISA's enactment,
suits challenging a plan administrator's denial of benefits were governed by
principles of contract law. 1 77 However, based on ERISA's trust-like structure,
the Court also stated that "[t]rust principles make a deferential standard of
review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers."' 178
In top hat benefit denial cases, when the employer is additionally the
administrator and fund provider, an inherent conflict of interest exists. 179 As
the Eleventh Circuit recognized some time ago, "inasmuch as '[t]he basis for
the deferential standard of review in the first place was the trust nature of most
ERISA plans,' the most important reason for deferential review is lacking."18
170 29 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(1) (1999).
171 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
172 29 U.S.C. § 144(b)(2)(A).
173 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
174 Torres v. Pittston Co., 346 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003).
115 But see Scipio v. United Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 411 (N.D. W. .Va.
2003). The court agreed with the proposition that a court should not act as deferentially as
would otherwise be appropriate when a fiduciary exercised discretion in the interpretation of
a disputed term and the fiduciary's interpretation furthered its own interest. Even so, the
court then concluded that the amount of money in dispute - $2,000,000 - was not significant
to the plan administrator, so even though the decision was made to benefit the fiduciary, the
deferential abuse of discretion standard applied in reviewing the plan administrator's deci-
sion. Id. at 419.
176 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989), affig in part, rev'g in
part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), afjfg in part, rev'g in part, 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
179 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1150.
"I Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1 th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
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A comparison of top hat plans to trusts is unworkable.'' The exclusion
of all of the trust principles from top hat plans makes these unfunded benefit
plans unilateral contracts.'1 2 In Goldstein,'83 the Third Circuit distinguished
top hat plans from other ERISA plans by pointing to the lack of trust provisions
applicable to top hat plans, as opposed to the substantive ERISA provisions
used to protect funded benefit plans.'" 4
In rejecting the Supreme Court's Firestone holding that the deferential
standard of review applied to plan administrators exercising discretionary
authority, the Goldstein court made the "emperor is wearing no clothes" obser-
vation that Firestone was "premised on the analogy of an ERISA plan to a
traditional trust."' 85 However, "[g]iven the unique nature of top hat plans," the
Third Circuit "believe[d] the holding of Firestone requiring deferential review
for the discretionary decisions of administrators to be inapplicable."'
186
The Goldstein court concluded that top hats plans more closely resemble a
different situation identified by the Supreme Court in Firestone where a plan
administrator does not have discretion to interpret the plan and is therefore not
a fiduciary, in which case the plan is reviewed de novo, according to the federal
common law of contract.
187
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie, 188 applied the
Firestone arbitrary and capricious standard of review to a top hat plan.' 89 In
Olander, a plan participant sued the plan administrator for excluding certain
payments made to the participant from the administrator's compensation calcu-
lations.'9 0 Resolution of the dispute centered on whether the payments
received by Olander were "compensation" for purposes of calculating plan ben-
efits.' Concluding the plan was a top hat plan subject to ERISA, the court
gave a "high degree of deference" to the administrator's decision to exclude the
payments on the basis that the administrator was a fiduciary.' 9 2 This result is
particularly surprising, given that a top hat plan does not possess any of the
181 Goldstein v. Johnson & Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 436 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that
"[b]ecause top hat plans are unfunded, do not vest, and their administrators have no fiduciary
responsibilities to the plan participant, the analogy to trust law 'fails, and the plans are more
appropriately considered as unilateral contracts, whereby neither party's interpretation is
entitled to any more 'deference' than the other party's."'); see also In re New Valley Corp,
89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996); Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc, 70 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir.
1995).
182 Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 436 (stating "this Court has routinely treated top hat plans differ-
ently from other kinds of plans" because these plans are "expressly exempted from most of




185 Id. at 436.
186 Id. at 442.
187 Id. at 443.
188 Olander v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 187 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 602.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 607.
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trust characteristics of a funded ERISA plan and its administrators are specifi-
cally exempt from any fiduciary duties.' 9 3
The result of the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone also appears to
conflict with ERISA's goal of providing a fair claims review process to plan
participants.' 94 To avoid a de novo review under Firestone's holding, a plan
sponsor merely has to add certain language to the plan to grant itself a more
deferential judicial standard of review. 9 5 As the Court itself recognized,
before ERISA was enacted, employee benefits denials were reviewed by the
courts under contract law, and terms were interpreted de novo unless the
employer was vested with final authority to determine benefit eligibility.
196
"The purpose of de novo review is to provide greater assurance that employees
will get the benefits to which they are entitled under the written terms of plan
documents." 1
9 7
A top hat plan supplemented with discretionary authority is, at most, an
illusory promise. In another Seventh Circuit case where language in a benefits
plan was determined insufficient to confer discretionary authority, Chief Judge
Posner said "[a]n ERISA plan is a contract, and the meaning of a contract is
ordinarily decided by the court, rather than by a party to the contract, let alone
the party that drafted it."'1 98 This statement is equally applicable to top hat
plans, if not more so, given the plan administrator's unfettered discretion and
lack of fiduciary duties to the plan participant.
Unintentionally, the Ninth Circuit provided some support for applying a
de novo standard of review to top hat plans in a dissenting opinion in Kearney
v. Standard Insurance.'9 9 In that welfare benefit case, a plurality of the en
banc court held that the language in a disability benefit plan required a de novo
review of the administrator's record, because the language was insufficient to
vest discretion in the plan administrator.2" The highly fractured court issued a
decision that included the filing of six different opinions.2 '
In his dissent, Judge Fernandez argued that the abuse of discretion stan-
dard should apply because the case before the court "does not involve a mere
contract; it involves an ERISA plan. The difference is exceedingly important
.... In an ordinary contract case, for example, one party is not a fiduciary for
the other."20 2 In arguing that ERISA plan decisions should be reviewed under
193 Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 443 ("it is well established in the caselaw that there is no cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty involving a top hat plan"); Demery v. Extebank Compen-
sation Plan, 216 F.3d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claims
under ERISA for a top hat plan because top hat plan administrators are not fiduciaries).
I" Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1999).
195 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
196 Id. at 112-13.
'97 Orozco v. United Air Lines, Inc., 887 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1989).
198 Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co, 205 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2000). The court, in finding
the plan language insufficient to grant the plan administrator discretionary authority, also
said "[a]n employer should not be allowed to get credit with its employees for having an
ERISA plan that confers solid rights on them and later, when an employee seeks to enforce
the right, pull a discretionary judicial review rabbit out of his hat." Id. at 332-33.
199 Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1101 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 1090.
201 Id. at 1084, 1096, 1099, 1101.
202 Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
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the abuse of discretion standard of review, Judge Fernandez repeatedly made
the point that mere contractual relationships do not provide as high a duty on
the plan administrator as does an ERISA plan, because ERISA administrators
have fiduciary duties to its participants.2" 3 In three different sentences, the dis-
sent mentioned how inappropriate it would be to bestow discretionary interpre-
tation to a party of a simple contract.
204
In fact, that is exactly the treatment of a top hat plan under ERISA - a top
hat plan is treated as a contract in which one party has the ability to provide
itself discretion to interpret the terms of the contract that the very party had a
hand in writing.
Plan administrators are likely to object to a bright-line application of the
de novo standard of review to top hat benefit claims denials, claiming increased
litigation and the attendant increase in plan administration costs. Interestingly,
in Firestone, the Court discussed Firestone's assertion that applying a de novo
standard of review to an employer's denial of benefits would add to administra-
tive and litigation expenses and thus discourage employers from implementing
benefit plans.2"5 Justice O'Connor responded: "as to both funded and
unfunded plans, the threat of increased litigation is not sufficient to outweigh
the reasons for a de novo standard that we have already explained." 2" This
explanation holds up especially well when considering the possibility of
increased litigation regarding top hat plan claim denials, because these plans
are limited to a small population of executives and any increase in litigation
will naturally be of a minimal amount.
Further, in Orozco v. United Air Lines,2 ° 7 a Ninth Circuit welfare benefit
case decided shortly after Firestone, the administrator argued that judicial
review under the de novo standard would increase its liability because the court
would "substitute its judgment for the judgment of [the] plan administrator. "208
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the de novo review itself would not increase
the administrator's liability, but rather would "increase[ ] the chance that this
court may disagree with [the administrator's] interpretation of the plan."209
The court said the administrator could not claim to suffer "substantial injustice
because it was counting on the fact that [the court] would review with greater
deference an interpretation of the plan which may not actually be supported by
the plan's terms or the facts regarding the parties' intent .... 21
The Orozco court reasoned that the Firestone decision requiring a de novo
standard of review was in part "to remedy a situation in which participants in
ERISA benefit plans were receiving less protection than they had been afforded
203 Id.
204 Id. (stating "we might be quite chary about bestowing a discretionary interpretation upon
the words of an insurance, or other normal, contract"). Id. at 1102 (stating "it might seem a
bit jarring to interpret ordinary contract language in a way that confers discretion, where one
party must depend on the mere good faith of the other"). Id. (stating "[i]n [the case of a
contract], the conferral of discretion may seem downright scary").
205 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 114.
206 Id. at 114-15.
207 Orozco v. United Air Lines, Inc., 887 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1989).





prior to adoption of ERISA."2 11 This purpose should not be defeated by per-
mitting an inherently-conflicted administrator to include plan language reserv-
ing to itself a discretionary judicial standard of review.
3. Top Hat Plan Administrators Have Incentives to Deny Benefits
ERISA fines and penalties do not apply to top hat plans.212 Because state
contract claims such as fraud or misrepresentation are preempted, no punitive
damages can be sought by top hat plan participants. 213 The court in its discre-
tion may award attorneys fees to a successful claimant, 214 but those fees are
limited to litigation expenses only and do not include the costs of the internal
appeal process. 21 5 Even when a court decides to award attorneys fees, it may
not award the full amount, because many courts apply a five-factor test'that
considers, among other things, the offending party's ability to pay the fees.216
So, the worst outcome for a plan administrator is that a court will order it
to pay the benefit it was required to pay in the first place; and, no matter how
arbitrary or capricious the denial of benefits, the administrator faces no further
penalties or fines under ERISA.2 17 With nothing left to chance, there is not
anything to discourage a plan administrator from denying benefit claims and
waiting to see if the plan participant has the financial wherewithal to incur
litigation expenses in an attempt to establish his rightful claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ERISA thirty years ago to protect retirement benefits of
private sector employees and to create uniformity and minimum standards for
the administration of ERISA plans. But, as applied to top hat plans, neither of
these objectives has been met - by Congressional design, no less.
The deck is stacked against top hat plan participants. Top hat plans are
subject to ERISA's procedural requirements, but not to any of its substantive
protections. A top hat plan administrator has no fiduciary responsibility to the
plan participant, and the plan participant bears all the risk of whether funds will
even be available at the point of termination or later, even though the partici-
211 Id.
212 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(l).
213 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
214 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
215 Michael A. McKuin, ERISA, at http://hometown.aol.com/mmckuin/erisa-page2.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
216 The remaining factors to be considered are: the degree of the offending party's culpabil-
ity or bad faith; whether an award of fees would deter others from acting similarly under like
circumstances; the relative merits of the parties' positions; and whether the action conferred
a common benefit on a group of pension plan participants. See, e.g., Chambless v. Masters,
Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 815 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1987); Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension
Bd., 956 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1992); Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 F.3d 307, 314 (9th Cir. 1996);
Black v. Bresee's Oneonta Dep't. Store, 919 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (while finding
for plaintiff in an ERISA action, and admonishing the defendant for actions the court
described as "unlawful," "plainly unreasonable," and culpable, the court still only awarded
one-half plaintiffs attorney's fees).
217 McKuin, supra note 215.
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pant may have little or no ability to influence the circumstances that might
place his retirement plan at risk.
In addition to having no obligation to act in the participant's best interest,
plan administrators are permitted to control the judicial standard of review
afforded them in any claim denial proceeding, simply by writing language in
the plan document giving themselves discretionary authority. And, worse yet,
because the plan administrator is also the funding source of the benefit plan,
every decision made as to whether to approve or deny benefits has a direct
impact on the profitability of the company - so the plan administrator operates
under an ongoing conflict of interest.
Unless ERISA is amended to allow top hat plan participants to be free
from ERISA's enforcement provisions, or amended to afford top hat plan par-
ticipants the same protections as other benefit plan participants, top hat plan
participants' retirement expectations will remain subject to events which can
neither be controlled nor predicted by the participant.
Alternatively, the judiciary should uniformly utilize a de novo standard of
review for top hat plan benefit denial claims, given the inherent conflict of the
plan administrator in making benefit decisions. Such a mandate must come
from the Supreme Court, and will have to be much more explicit than the
Court's directive in Firestone, which served instead to divide the courts of
appeals into three camps regarding application of the standard of review in
conflicted administrator decisions.
So, do you put your top hat in, or put your top hat out? Or do you give it
to the courts and let them shake discretion out? That's what it's all about ....
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